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John G. Mac'Kie, II1*

On June 4, 1984, pursuant to the creation of the Florida Mobile
Home Act,' the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums was
redesignated as the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums,
and Mobile Homes. In drafting the Mobile Home Act, the objective of
the Florida Legislature was to strike a balance between the interests of
the park owners and tenants of the mobile home parks. This legislation,
like its Condominium Act2 predecessor, continues the trend toward
consumer protection in the real property area.
While the original Condominium Act provided only a basic framework for the creation and operation of condominiums, amendments
adopted in the early 1970's began increasingly to detail the rights and
duties of developers and unit owners. 3 It has been suggested that the
numerous amendments to the Condominium Act are evidence that the
legislature sought to address problems without a clear understanding of
the concept of condominium ownership.4 The view that the frequent
modifications of the Condominium Act is indicative of the legislature's
inability to effectively deal with condominium problems is unwarranted. Certainly, the Florida Legislature has acted frequently to regulate the development and operation of residential condominiums. In doing so through amendments to the Condominium Act, however, the
legislature has responded positively to the pleas of constituents for legislation to establish rights and protections for purchasers, developers,
unit owners, lending institutions, and the associations that are established to operate the condominiums. Analysis of the Mobile Home Act
suggests two additional amendments to the Condominium Act be
* J.D., University of Mississippi, 1984; LL.M., University of Miami, 1985; B.A.,
Dickinson College, 1976. Mr. Mac'Kie is currently associated with the firm of Forsyth,
Swaim, & Brugger in Naples, Florida, where he specializes in real estate law.
1. FLA. STAT. § 720 (1983).
2. FLA. STAT. § 718 (1983).
3. FLA. STAT. Chs. 711 et seq. and 718 et seq. (1974 & 1979).
4. Andrews, Governmental Considerations:A Proposed Common Interest Community Act, FLA. BAR J. 144, 145 (Feb. 1981).
Published by NSUWorks, 1985

1

Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 3

Nova Law Journal

[Vol. 10

adopted to better serve the interests of both condominium unit owners
and developers. The first amendment would impose, on those condominium associations that have reserved a right-of-first-refusal, a fortyfive day limit 5 in which to decide whether or not to exercise the preemptive right. The amendment is a necessary response to the judicial
enforcement of right-of-first-refusal provisions that chill sales and remove property from commerce by granting condominium associations
unreasonably long periods of time to decide whether or not to
purchase.6 The second amendment would require the Condominium Division to furnish standardized prospectus forms to developers. This
would facilitate compliance with section 718.504 and curtail the perpetual findings by the Condominium Division that such filings are deficient, causing costly delays to developers.
Amendment One: 45-Day Limit on the Right-of-First-Refusal
During the century and a half that followed the Norman Conquest, the landowner who attempted to convey his property might meet
with opposition from his feudal overlord who objected to the transfer
because the proposed transferee was not a suitable person to perform
the feudal services due for the land.7 The enactment in 1290 of the
Statute of Westminster III, commonly known as Quia Emptores, however, abolished such restrictions on alienation by providing "[t]hat
from henceforth it shall be lawful to every freeman to sell at his own
pleasure his lands and tenements, or part of them . .. This statute
extendeth but only to lands holden in fee simple." 8 Since the passage of
Quia Emptores, the right of free and unlimited alienation has been
5. The imposition of a 45-day limit on the time condominium associations have
to decide whether or not to purchase would be in keeping with prior legislative expressions of reasonableness concerning the duration of rights-of-first-refusal. Section
720.110 of the Mobile Home Act provides for a 45-day period during which the mobile
home park tenants, through the Homeowners' Association, have the right to purchase
the park before it can be sold to a third party. Additionally, section 718.612 of the
Condominium Act gives a tenant of an apartment being converted into a condominium
a 45-day period within which to exercise a right-of-first-refusal to purchase the unit in
which he resides.
6. Florida courts have consistently upheld right-of-first-refusal provisions without
regard to the duration of the time period granted the association to make its preemptive election. See infra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
7. FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 1 (1954).

8.

BARRINGTON, MAGNA CARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND,

279 (2d ed. 1300).
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recognized as an inherent quality of a fee simple estate. 9 Today, however, some condominium owners in Florida are being deprived of this
right by the judicial enforcement of unreasonable right-of-first-refusal
provisions.
A right-of-first-refusal is a covenant often included in the condominium declaration whereby the association is granted the opportunity
to purchase a unit in the project before it can be sold to a third party.
In order to exercise the right, the association must purchase for the
same price and on the same terms that the owner is willing to accept
from a third party in a bona fide offer. Restraints in the form of a
right-of-first-refusal are being upheld by the Florida courts as a legitimate device for association retention of control over unwanted transferees. 10 As a consequence, a condominium owner in Florida who wishes
to sell his unit may find his conveyance unduly hindered, not by a feudal overlord, but by the condominium association's right-of-first-refusal
that grants the association an unreasonable time period to decide
whether or not to exercise its preemptive option.
The rule against restraints on alienation is designed to free property from unjustifiable encumbrances tending to make it less marketable."1 The policy against such restraints is based on the belief that restraints "remove property from commerce, concentrate wealth,
prejudice creditors, and discourage property improvements. 1 2 Clearly,
a right-of-first-refusal which grants the association an unreasonable period of time to decide whether or not to exercise its preemptive option
defeats the rule against restraints on alienation by taking property out
of commerce.13 Where such a right-of-first-refusal exists, both the prospective purchaser and the seller must be prepared to wait until the
association decides whether or not to exercise the option. If the rightof-first-refusal grants an unreasonably long period of time for the association to decide whether or not to purchase, many prospective buyers

9. See, e.g., In re Estate of Dees, 308 P.2d 90; Christmas v. Winston, 67 S.E. 58.
10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11. Parker, Right of First Refusal - Homogeniety in the Condominium, 18
VAND. L. REV. 1810, 1816 (1965).
12. CASNER & LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 1008 (1969).
13. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(5) (1983) provides that the rule against perpetuities
shall not be applied to defeat a right given any person or entity by the declaration for
the purpose of allowing unit owners to retain reasonable control over the use, occupancy, and transfer of condominium units. Thus, preemptions, rights-of-first-refusal,
options, and similar devices are exempted from the rule against perpetuities in the condominium context.
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would not make offers because they would not want to be bound for a
long period of time without an assurance that they would get the property.14 Thus there definitely would be a restraint on alienation.
The background for the Florida courts' interpretation of the rightof-first-refusal clauses as reasonable can be found in cases dealing with
cooperatives. 15 In a New York case in 1886,6 the court upheld the
right of the cooperative association to enjoin the tenant's proposed sublease of his apartment."7 In upholding the injunction because the proposed subletting would violate the cooperative's rules and would result
in "an invasion and demolition of the design of construction,"18 the
court intimated that the cooperative apartment was a special arrangement which should be protected by the law.1 9 Half a century later, in
68 Beacon Street v. Sohier, ° the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld
a non-assignability clause in a ninety-nine year proprietary lease of a
stock cooperative. 1 The court reasoned that
[t]he rule against restraints on alienation is not violated because an
inalienable estate was not created. The corporation as owner of the
estate could sell the property at any time and such sale could be
authorized by the written consent of the holders of eighty-seven
and one-half percent of the capital stock. 2
During the latter years of the depression, Mrs. Belle Harris assigned her ninety-nine year lease and shares of stock in 1158 Fifth Avenue, Inc. to Penthouse Properties, Inc.' s Mrs. Harris' cooperative asso14. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 68 (1981).
15. A cooperative apartment consists of "[d]welling units in a multi-dwelling
complex in which each owner has an interest in the entire complex and a lease of his
own apartment, though he does not own his apartment as in the case of a condominium." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 302 (5th ed. 1979). See Ross, Condominiums and
Preemptive Options: The Right of First Refusal, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 585 (1967) for a
general discussion of this line of cases.
16. Barrington Apt. Ass'n. v. Watson, 83 Misc. 114, 98 N.Y.S. 132 (1886).
17. Id. at 548.
18. Id.
19. Id. Even from the beginning a distinction was drawn between the cooperative form of ownership and estates in fee simple.
20. 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935).
21. 289 Mass. at 361, 194 N.E. at 306-09.
22. Id. The fact that the entire property could be sold on the authorization of
tenants holding 871/2% of the stock does not address that particular tenant's right of
free alienability.
23. Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 A.D. 685, 11
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/3
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ciation refused to accept the transfer, refused to take rental payments
from the assignee, and sued Mrs. Harris for past-due rent.24 The New
York court stated that while there is a rule against restraining the
transfer of property, in the case of a proprietary lease, "the special
nature of ownership of cooperative apartment houses by tenant owners
requires that they be not included in the general rule"2 5 against such
restraints. The court observed that the special nature of cooperative
ownership extends from the fact that the failure of one tenant to pay
his portion of maintenance charges increases the liability of the other
tenant stockholders.26 Another New York case2" in 1959 upheld a stock
cooperative's refusal to consent to an assignment of stock and the lease,
and implied that the discretion of a cooperative corporation based on
non-discriminatory grounds was not reviewable by the courts.2 8
A case that exemplifies the misguided liberality with which the
courts treat right-of-first-refusal clauses is Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, Inc.29 The cooperative in this Illinois case took a
curious form. Characteristically, the cooperative housing association
held legal title to the real estate, and the members were entitled to the
perpetual use and occupancy of their respective dwellings. This cooperative, however, was atypical in that it was not an apartment complex,
but consisted of a subdivision of seventy-two single family homes. The
form of ownership was further distinguishable from the traditional
stock cooperative in that the residents, although members of the cooperative association, had obtained their own financing, made their own
mortgage payments, arranged and paid for the insurance on their
homes, and otherwise conducted themselves as the owners of the dwellN.Y.S.2d 417 (1939).
24. Id.
25. 254 A.D. 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d 423.
26. Id.
27. Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190
N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
28. 6 N.Y.2d at 434, 160 N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
The statute which prohibits discrimination in co-operatives because of
race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry is not involved in this case.
Absent the application of these statutory standards .... there is no reason
why the owners of the co-operative apartment house could not decide for
themselves with whom they wish to share their elevators, their common
halls and facilities, their stockholders' meetings, their management
problems and responsibilities and their homes. Id.
29. 171 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1960).
Published by NSUWorks, 1985

5

Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 3

Nova Law Journal

[Vol. 10

ings they occupied.3 0 The membership contract provided that when a
member sought to withdraw, the association had twelve months in
which to purchase the membership at any of three prices: 1) the selling price in the seller's notice to the association; 2) an agreed-on price;
or 3) an impartial appraisal. If the association's right was not exercised
within the twelve-month period, the membership could be sold on the
market, but the association still retained a ninety-day right of redemption. 31 These provisions were challenged as unlawful restraints on alienation, and despite the exceedingly long period of time allowed the association to exercise its option, and even though the association was not a
traditional stock cooperative, the Illinois court upheld the restraint on
transfer. 2 In reaching its decision, the court said:
From the authorities ... examined, it would appear that the crucial inquiry should be directed at the utility of the restraint as compared with the injurious consequences that will flow from its enforcement. If accepted social and economic considerations dictate
that a partial restraint is reasonably necessary for their fulfillment,
such a restraint should be sustained. No restraint should be sustained simply because it is limited in time, or the class of persons
excluded is not total, or all modes of alienation are not prohibited.
These qualifications lessen the degree to which restraints violate
general public policy against restraining alienation of property and
should be considered to that extent; but they are not, in themselves,
sufficient to overcome it. In short, the law of property, like other
areas of the law, is not a mathematical science but takes shape at
the direction of social and economic forces in an ever-changing society, and decisions should be made to turn on these
considerations."3
Thus, in Gale the court balanced the utility of the restraint with
the injurious consequences that flowed from its enforcement and found
the restrictions to be both reasonably necessary to the continuance of
the cooperative association and not productive of injurious consequences since their effect in keeping "property out of commerce was
entirely problematical."3 4 The court's reasoning is unsound. Clearly,
the restrictions were not necessary to the continuance of the coopera30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 34.
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tive association. There was no blanket mortgage on the property. Instead, each resident procured his own financing. Consequently, the risk
of foreclosure in Gale was individualized. There was no financial interdependence among the members of the cooperative association, and in
the absence of such financial interdependence, the need for the restraint simply was not compelling. Further, the injurious consequences
which can flow from enforcement of such restraints are not problematic; they are very real. A prospective buyer faced the possibility of
waiting a year to purchase, finally doing so, and then having the cooperative association exercise its right of redemption ninety days later.
Such a prospect has a chilling effect on sales and works to remove
property from commerce.
The approach taken by Florida courts when asked to rule on the
validity of right-of-first-refusal provisions is similar to that taken by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Gale. The test applied by Florida courts with
respect to restraints on alienation is that of reasonableness.3 5 The validity or invalidity of a restraint is said to depend upon its long-term effect
on the improvement and marketability of the property.36 In practice,
this test of reasonableness involves a balancing of the interests of communal harmony against the policy favoring free alienation and use of
property. It is apparent that, to date, Florida courts find that maintaining a community that is both socially and financially homogenous is of
paramount importance because the close proximity of condominium living presupposes social compatibility among tenants.
The Florida courts refuse to address the reasonableness of the duration of the time period within which condominium associations may
exercise the right-of-first-refusal. 1 Like the Illinois Supreme Court in
Gale, Florida courts fail to distinguish between cases involving stock
cooperatives and those involving the condominium form of ownership.
This distinction is critical in order to properly determine whether a particular restraint is reasonable or unreasonable. A restriction that is
valid for a cooperative may well be an unreasonable restraint on alienation when applied to condominium ownership. This is due to the special
nature of the cooperative in that it requires permanence of tenancy,
35. Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 614 (Fla. 1980).
36. Id.
37. See Boyer & Spiegel, Land Use Control: Pre-emptions, Perpetuities and
Similar Restraints,20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 148, 180 (1965) (discusses why the length of
time during which the preemptionor has to decide should be a factor in determining
reasonableness).
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social compatibility, and financial responsibility for its very existence.3"
The policy dictated by the special nature of the cooperative does
not apply to condominiums. The distinctions that demand disparate
treatment are two-fold. First and foremost, there is no financial interdependence of condominium unit owners as there is in cooperative ownership. While cooperatives generally have a blanket mortgage on the
entire project, condominium owners finance their units individually.
Therefore, the need for a financial screening device is not crucial for
condominium associations. The objective of obtaining financial compatability may adequately be served by setting a sales price that tends
to discourage "undesirables". Secondly, the condominium unit is exclusively a fee interest rather than a hybrid-type leasehold.39 While the
cooperative member occupies his unit as a mere tenant, the condominium owner acquires a fee simple interest in the real property. Thus, in
cooperatives, restraints on alienation may be more easily upheld, while
restrictions on the transfer of condominium units demand stricter
scrutiny.
Regarding restraints on the alienation of condominium parcels, the
Florida cases may be broken down into two categories; those involving
restraints on leasing which are quite sensibly upheld as partial restraints,40 and those granting a right-of-first-refusal to the interested
condominium association, which warrant closer analysis.
A 1961 decision, Blair v. Kingsley,4 1 illustrates the lengths to
which Florida courts will go to find that restraints on alienation in the
form of preemptive rights are reasonable. In that case, the plaintiffs
alleged that the restrictive covenant in their deed was an unreasonable
restraint upon alienation in that it allowed the grantor a right-of-firstrefusal to purchase the property for one year, should the property be

38. Parker, supra note 11, at 1819.

39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Pine Island Condominium "F" Ass'n, Inc. v. Waters, 374 So. 2d
1033 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (not unreasonable for association to withhold approval where owner in default); Seagate Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d
484 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (leasing restrictions not unlimited and, therefore,
reasonable since owners could change restriction by amending declaration); Kroop v.
Caravella Condominium, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (amendment to declaration allowing owners to rent units no more than once held not an unreasonable restraint); Holiday Out in America at St. Lucie, Inc. v. Bowes, 285 So. 2d 63
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (rental restriction valid since owners could sell at any
time).
41. 128 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/3
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offered for sale within twelve years of the deed.4 2 The plaintiffs alleged

several grounds on which they contended the court could find the restraint unreasonable, 43 including "that the one year allowed to the defendant for the exercise of this covenant would require ...

a very pa-

'
tient purchaser." 44
The defendant-developer offered several
justifications for inclusion of the covenant, indicating that the plaintiffs

had notice of it at the time of purchase and that many of the other

grantees were in favor of the restriction. 45 Further, the developer insisted that he would not have sold the land to the plaintiffs without
inclusion of the covenant in the deed. 46 In finding the one-year restraint
to be reasonable, the court stated:
We are favored by the citation of numerous cases and annotations,
including several Florida cases. From our study of both the research books and the decisions, we are convinced that the instant
covenant is valid and should be upheld, whether it be called a preemption ... or an option to repurchase. 47

The court offered no further explanation of its reasoning in upholding the restraint. If there was any balancing of interests by the

court, the scale was certainly weighted in favor of the developer in find42. Id. at 890. The covenant read in pertinent part:
Grantees herein, by acceptance of this deed, and in consideration of the
sale and conveyance of the herein described property, hereby agree and
covenant with the grantor herein, his heirs or assigns, that in the event
grantees, their heirs or assigns, shall offer for sale the above described
property within a period of 12 years from date, that said grantor, his heirs,
assigns or nominee, shall have the first right of refusal to purchase said
property and shall have a period of one year in which to purchase same.
The purchase price shall be the fair market value, which shall be determined by the owner of the above described property appointing one appraiser, the grantor herein appointing one appraiser, and the two appraisers appointing a third, and the determination of any two of the three
appraisers shall fix a fair value. Id.
43. Id. The other two rationales offered by the plaintiffs were 1) "that the appraisers' valuation will not reflect those subjective factors which influence prospective
purchasers;" and 2) "that a flexible real estate market could easily change values during the same one year period." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The defendant further pointed out that he had waived his right every
time a grantee had wanted to sell so far. Id.
47. Id. at 891.
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
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ing that the restraint was reasonable. The court appeared to give little
weight to the fact that if the plaintiff attempted to sell his property, it
was subject to repurchase by the developer for twelve years.
In Chianese v. Culley48 the plaintiffs contracted to purchase a condominium unit from Culley, who refused to close the transaction because the condominium association asserted its rights under the declaration. The declaration provided that the association had sixty days
within which to either approve of a proposed purchaser or furnish another purchaser on terms equally favorable to the seller. 49 The association provided an alternate purchaser as provided in the declaration, but
at that point, Chianese, who had originally contracted to purchase from
Culley, brought this lawsuit, alleging that the covenant in the declaration was an "illegal restraint against alienation of property and that the
defendants were discriminating against the plaintiffs on the basis of
their religion or national origin."' 50 Culley then issued a deed to Chianese, but the condominium association refused to recognize the trans-

48. 397 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
49. Id. at 1346. The declaration provided in pertinent part:
Election of Association. Within sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice,
the Association must approve the transaction or furnish a purchaser or
lessee approved by the Association who will accept terms as favorable to
the seller as the terms stated in the notice. Such purchaser or lessee furnished by the Association may have not less than sixty (60) days subsequent to the date of approval within which to close the transaction. The
approval of the Association shall be in recordable form and delivered to
the purchaser or lessee.
Id. at 1345.
50. Id. at 1345. This article is not focusing on the discriminatory aspects of
rights-of-first-refusal but on the purely legal question of reasonableness of the restraint
itself, based primarily on the amount of time allowed for exercise of the right-of-firstrefusal.
For a case considering the possible discriminatory results, see Capital Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 (1967). The court there stated:
No matter by what various terms the covenant under consideration may be
classified by astute counsel, it is still a racial restriction in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. That this is so has
been definitely decided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. High sounding phrases or outmoded common law terms
cannot alter the effect of the agreement embraced in the instant case.
While the hands may seem to be the hands of Esau to a blind Isaac, the
voice is definitely Jacob's. We cannot give our judicial approval or blessing
to a contract such as is here involved.
Id. at 255.
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action. 51 In deciding whether or not the clause constituted an illegal
restraint on alienation, the court held that the provision granting the
association sixty days either to approve the sale or furnish another purchaser on the same terms was a valid right-of-first-refusal. 52 The court
stated that covenants restricting the use of land are not favored, but
that they will be upheld "if they are confined to lawful purposes, are
within reasonable bounds, and are expressed in clear language. '53 Despite this language, the court never addressed the issue of whether or
not the sixty-day duration of the preemptive right was reasonable,but
relied instead on the fact that the case did not involve an absolute restraint. Under the court's analysis, the restraint was not absolute because the property could be sold at the close of the period granted the
association to exercise its preemptive right. Presumably, the provision
would be upheld as a valid right-of-first-refusal regardless of whether
the period was of a duration of sixty days or sixty years. It appears that
in balancing the interests represented by this case, the need for a socially homogenous community weighed heavily, while the policy favoring free alienation of property was essentially ignored.
Watergate Corporation v. Reagan" involved a right-of-first-refusal, not in the condominium context, but with respect to a parcel of
raw land. The case merits note, however, in light of the court's cavalier
sanctioning of the preemptive right that was at issue. In fact, neither
the time the right-of-first-refusal was executed, nor the time of its exercise is ever mentioned in the decision. In ruling that the right-of-firstrefusal did not impose an unlawful restraint upon the free alienation of
the property, the court stated its absurd rationale: "[A]lienability is not
restrained at all, but is in fact enhanced because the seller has two
55
potential buyers instead of one."
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the question of the reasonableness of the right-of-first-refusal in 1980.56 In that case, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to the Florida Supreme
Court to determine the state's law concerning whether a repurchase
option in a deed violated the rule against unreasonable restraints on
51. 397 F. Supp. at 1345.
52. Id. at 1347.
53. Id. at 1346 (citing Zoda v. Zoda, 292 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1974)) (emphasis added).
54. 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
55. Id. at 136.
56. Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980).
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
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alienation. 57 The deed in question provided that, should the grantee desire to sell his property, he must offer it to the grantor for the price of
the amount paid by the grantee plus the cost of all permanent improvements on the land. The covenant provided the grantor sixty days to
exercise their option, after which the grantee had the right to sell the
property to other parties. 58 The Florida Supreme Court set forth the
policy underlying the rule against unreasonable restraints, stating that
the rule "is principally concerned with the duration of a restraint on
the property. '59 Incongruously, in the next paragraph of the decision,
the court stated that "[i]t is generally agreed that an option restraint is
reasonable if the option price is at market or appraised value, irrespective of the duration of the option".60 The court's failure to consider the
duration of the preemptive option flies in the face of the court's stated
rule of reasonableness"' in restraint-on-alienation cases.
The position taken by the Florida courts that the duration of restraints is immaterial to their validity is untenable. The stubborn fact is
that where a right-of-first-refusal is granted, alienation cannot take
place until either the preemptionor makes the election to purchase or
the time allotted expires. The more extended the preemption period,
the less likely it is that a purchaser will be willing to be bound for the
period of time during which he is committed, but the condominium
association is not. Such a prospect has a chilling effect on sales and
works to remove property from commerce. Despite this, condominium
associations that have included a right-of-first-refusal in the condominium declaration are presently under no legislative or judicial time constraint whatever to decide whether or not to exercise their preemptive
right. As the cases discussed have shown, provisions granting condo-

57. Id. at 611. The Fifth Circuit also questioned whether the covenant violated
the rule against perpetuities, and whether or not the deed could be rescinded if the
covenant was void. Id.
The Florida legislature settled the perpetuities question with regard to condominiums by statute: FLA. STAT. § 718.104(5) (1983). See supra note 5 and accompanying

text.
58. 383 So. 2d at 611.
59. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
60. Id. (emphasis added). The court noted several Florida decisions that have so
held: Watergate Corp. v. Reagan, 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (see
supra notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text); Blair v. Kingsley, 128 So. 2d 889 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text); and Wing,
Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
61. 383 So. 2d at 614.
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/3
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minium associations unreasonably long periods of time to purchase are
routinely upheld by the courts. The judicial enforcement of these unreasonable right-of-first-refusal provisions amounts to the sanctioning
of illegal restraints on alienation.
In the Mobile Home Act, the Florida legislature provided for a
forty-five day period during which the mobile home park tenants,
through the homeowners' association, have the right to purchase the
park before it can be sold to a third party. While this provision may
have little practical significance for mobile home park tenants, who in
most instances will lack the necessary financial resources to exercise the
right-of-first-refusal, the forty-five day limitation lights the path for a
much needed change in condominium law. Since the judiciary declines
to consider the time period during which the condominium association
may decide whether or not to purchase as a factor in determining
whether alienation has been illegally impeded, it is incumbent on the
legislature to redress the injurious effects of restraints. This could be
accomplished by drafting a provision for the Condominium Act limiting the time which the condominium association has to declare its intention to purchase to forty-five days.
Amendment Two: Standardized Prospectus Form
In 1979, the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums
conducted an in-house review of deficiency letters sent to developers
and found that approximately ninety percent of the filings made with
the Division were deficient.6 2 The majority of the deficiencies related to
the failure of the developer to provide the information required by the
statute;63 only a small percentage of the deficiencies were substantive in
nature. Most of the deficiencies consisted of failure to include required
caveats, improper budgeting or assessment calculations, confusion regarding which version of the Condominium Act is current, and a "failure to properly assimilate the necessary filing materials and organize
those materials in the fashion required by the rules of the Division.""
Clearly, a problem relating to compliance with the non-substantive filing requirements of the Condominium Act exists. A solution to this
dilemma exists in standardization of forms delineating the items re62. Andrews, Governmental Considerations:A Proposed Common Interest Community Act, FLA. BAR J. 144, 146 (Feb. 1981).

63.

FLA. STAT.

§ 718.504 (1976).

64. Andrews, supra note 62.
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quired by the Condominium Act for inclusion in the prospectus.
A standardized prospectus form could alleviate the plethora of unsuccessful though voluminous attempts by developers to comply with
the "laundry list""5 of items required for inclusion in the prospectus.
Condominium documentation is copious enough - it is not uncommon
for offering plans to run over two hundred pages of single-spaced
type.6" The requirement of extensive disclosure by the Bureau of Condominiums often results in "creative drafting. ' 67 While creative drafting is often the hallmark of a good lawyer, it may cause problems when
the project at hand requires strict adherence to statutory requirements.
Creative drafting of8 documents often produces lengthy, complex, and
6
unreadable results.
There is a call within the Real Property Bar for standardization of
a multitude of documents in the condominium field.6 9 These attorneys
point out that standardization would simplify the various forms required by the Condominium Act, such as the declaration and bylaws.
One commentator, in calling for a standardized set of condominium
bylaws, equated them with "the procedural requirements for incorporation and for creation of the bylaws governing the operation of a corporation once it is legally created. 170 This writer, however, opposes an
across-the-board standardization of all condominium documents, especially the standardization of bylaws. The day-to-day workings of a condominium cannot be equated to that of a commercial corporation.
Greater flexibility must be allowed in drafting operating rules for unit
owners. The formulation of bylaws is an area of condominium documentation that often calls for creative drafting on the part of an experienced real estate attorney. The prospectus, on the other hand, is
65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.504 (1976): "(b) A description of the condominium property, including, without limitation:
1. The number of buildings, the number of units in each building, the
number of bathrooms and bedrooms in each unit, and the total number of

units," or
"2. A reference to the location in the disclosure materials of the lease or
other agreements providing for the use of those facilities."
66. Rohan, The "Model Condominium Code" - A Blueprint for Modernizing
Condominium Legislation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 587, 589 n. 13 (1978).
67. Andrews, supra note 62.
68. One enterprising developer went so far as to provide "a translation ... written [in] humanese." See Windjammer of PensacolaBeach File, Bureau of Condomini-

ums, Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums.
69. Andrews, supra note 62.
70. Id.
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strictly statutory in its requirements, and those requirements could best
be met by the Bureau of Condominium furnishing standardized forms
for the prospectus.
A former chief of the Bureau of Condominiums 71 called the "filing
of condominium documents with the Division ...the most complicated

and lengthy"72 of the types of filings required by the Condominium
Act. As evidenced by the Division's review of deficiency letters,7 3 numerous errors in filing are made by developers attempting to comply
with the statutory requirements. In an attempt to identify and eliminate these errors, the processing of the prospectus and other documents
is divided into two phases. Initially, the Bureau reviews the documents
to determine whether they have been submitted in the form prescribed
by section 7D-17.05(1) of the Florida Administrative Code. The Bureau is allowed ten business days to make this determination. If the
documents have not been submitted in proper form, the developer is so
notified, and the documents are not reviewed until corrections are
made. Once submitted in proper form, the documents are examined by
the Condominium Division staff, which has another forty-five days in
which to notify the developer of any deficiencies.7 4 It is evident that the
finding of a deficiency results in substantial delays. These delays become significant in light of the fact that closings on contracts are prohibited until the examination process is completed and notification is
received from the Division. The delays are costly in terms of the additional legal expenses incurred, but much more significantly, in that failure to adhere to the project's original timetable may well jeopardize the
developer's financing arrangements by cutting off the flow of down payments received from prospective unit purchasers.
In order to remedy these costly delays, the developer must have a
clear picture of the procedural requirements of the documents he must
file with the Bureau of Condominiums. The Bureau examines a prospectus in order to ensure it meets the statutory requirements of disclosure. The examiner also compares the various documents filed with
the Bureau in order to determine any internal inconsistencies or other
deficiencies. From its examination of multitudes of condominium docu71.

Faye Mayberry, former chief of the Bureau of Condominiums, is now head

of the Mobile Home Division.
72. Mayberry, Governmental Considerations: The Bureau of Condominiums Its Function and Goals, FLA. BAR J. 139, 140 (Feb. 1981).
73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
74. Mayberry, supra note 72, at 141.
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ments, the Bureau compiled a list of common deficiencies found in a
prospectus, all consisting of failure to make required disclosures:
1. Omission of the estimated completion date in the prospectus or the purchase agreement as required by Section
718.504(4)(b)(3), F.S.
2. Failure to provide a description of facilities to be used in
common with other condominiums as required by Section
718.504(7), F.S. and failure to include use agreements or other
documents related to facilities serving unit owners but not owned
by them.
3. Omission in the prospectus of the identity of the supplier
of utilities and other services, as required by Section 718.504(18),
F.S.
4. Omission in the prospectus of the purchaser closing expenses as required by Section 718.504(2)(1), F.S.
5. Omission in the prospectus of the relevant experience of
the developer and chief operating officer as required by Section
718.504(22), F.S.
6. Failure to provide complete disclosure relating to recreational facilities as required by Section 718.504(6), especially the
number of people the facility will accommodate.
7. Failure to specify the number of buildings, units in each
building, bathrooms and bedrooms and the total number of units as
required by Section 718.504(4)(b)(1), F.S.
8. Failure to explain the manner in which the apportionment
of common expenses and ownership
was determined as required by
71
Section 718.504(19), F.S.
By virtue of its experience and expertise in examination of the condominium prospectus and other documents, the Bureau of Condominiums clearly has the wherewithal to create a prospectus form that would
avoid these common pitfalls. Again, it is the Mobile Home Act 76 that
lights the legislative path. Section 720.302(7) of that Act requires the
Mobile Home Division to provide a form prospectus which may be prepared and filed by park owners. The form allows the park owners to
adhere to the disclosure requirements of section 720.303 by responding

75. MAYBERRY, AVOIDING PITFALLS IN FILING WITH THE DIVISION (available
upon request from the Bureau of Condominiums, Division of Florida Land Sales and
Condominiums, Tallahassee).
76. FLA. STAT. § 720 (1976).
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to questions and requests for specific information to be provided.7 7 A
similar form, provided by the Bureau of Condominiums, could alleviate
the deficiencies in the filing of prospectus requirements for condominium developers, thereby eliminating delay and waste in the development of condominium projects.
Conclusion
It is incumbent on the Florida legislature to act once again to improve the Condominium Act. The solution to the two problem areas
discussed in this article is found in the Mobile Home Act. In that Act,
a forty-five day time limit was placed on the preemptive right of mobile
home park tenants to purchase a park before it can be sold to a third
party. Such a limitation is reasonable in its duration and recommends
itself for adoption into the Condominium Act. In order to protect condominium owners and purchasers, a forty-five day limit, similarly,
should be imposed on the time period that condominium associations
have to decide whether or not to exercise their rights-of-first-refusal.
This limitation would redress the judicial sanctioning of preemptive options that are unreasonable in duration and chill sales, removing property from commerce. Finally, the Mobile Home Act requires that park
owners be provided a form prospectus. An amendment to the Condominium Act should similarly require the Condominium Division to furnish standardized prospectus forms to developers in order to facilitate
compliance with the extensive disclosure requirements of section
718.504 and eliminate costly delays that result from deficient filings.

77.

FLA. STAT.
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